The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945

Bibliographic Data

ID10072826
AuthorsLothar Kettenacker (corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume17
Issue3
Pages435-458
Publication date1982-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/002200948201700303
OpenAlexW2007691543
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited2

response to the Fascist challenge. Strangely enough, however, it has never been asked whether similar symptoms can be detected in British relations with the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Among the historiographical assumptions to account for this two are of particular importance. Firstly, the Anglo-Soviet alliance of May 1942 was advocated by former anti-appeasers like Churchill and Eden who would not admit that their approach to Stalin was not altogether different from Chamberlain's dealings with Hitler. Secondly, attention has been focused on the United States as the new 'superpower', as though responsibility for co-operation with Moscow during the war as well as for the ensuing Cold War must be laid at the feet of the new leading nation of the West and nowhere else. If it can be proved that the same motives and methods were at work in British relations with both Hitler and Stalin, the concept of appeasement would appear to be meaningless or else to require redefinition. In his study on 'Russia's Road to the Cold War', perhaps the most thorough refutation of American revisionist historiography, Mastny comes to the conclusion that British diplomacy during the Second World War 'makes the

Alliance · Ancient history · Economic history · Political science · European history and politics · Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics · History · Law · World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact

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