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The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era

Bibliographic Data

ID10073508
AuthorsPaul Haggie (corresponding author)
Year1973
Volume8
Issue3
Pages113-131
Publication date1973-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/002200947300800306
OpenAlexW1981373887
LanguageEN
Citations received6

When John Arbuthnot Fisher returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord on Trafalgar Eve, I904, it was obvious to all who followed naval affairs that a period of major reform would ensue. Apart from Lord Charles Beresford, Fisher was the best known naval personality in the land. As Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean he had greatly improved the speed, gunnery, and tactical efficiency of the Fleet, while as Second Sea Lord and subsequently C-in-C Portsmouth he had already, by his control over the appointments of service personnel, laid the groundwork for reform. The Daily Express, later to become one of his most bitter Fleet Street critics, captured the optimism with which Fisher's return to Whitehall was greeted in a famous cartoon. In it, Nelson is seen clambering back on to his column at the sight of Fisher entering the Admiralty; the caption reads: 'I was on my way down to lend them a hand myself, but if Jacky Fisher's taking on the job there's no need for me to be nervous, I'll get back on my pedestal.' The feeling was well founded. In his years as First Sea Lord almost every corer of the Admiralty was rigorously examined and overhauled. The pace was relentless, the constantly reiterated goal 'INSTANT readiness for War!' In one vital respect, however, the naval preparation for war remained inadequate, for little progress was made towards the development of a War Staff during Fisher's tenure of office. In fact not only did he fail to support such a development, he maintained a fierce opposition to it which is at first sight surprising in view of his earlier pronouncements on the subject of war planning. It is a paradox that has often been noted, but never satisfactorily explained, that the same man who appeared to be conscious of this important deficiency in the Navy's intellectual preparation for modern war when C-in-C Mediterranean, should

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,15
Citation span1986 - 2022 (37)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 6

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