The Russian Mobilization in 1914
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10073668 |
|---|---|
| Authors | L C F Turner (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1968 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 65-88 |
| Publication date | 1968-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200946800300104 |
| OpenAlex | W1519556464 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
The German government's immediate declaration of a state of war emergency on 31 July, followed by their ultimatum demanding the cessation of Russian military preparations, constituted only technically the initiative in aggression. In view of the great revival of interest in July 1914, it seems desirable to re-examine the evidence relating to Russian mobilization and to assess its significance in the general framework of the crisis. The actions of the French and Russian General Staffs in 1914 were strongly influenced by the character of the Schlieffen Plan, of whose general outlines they were well aware. The initial Russian mobilization plan called for the assembly of four Russian armies against the Austrians in Galicia while two armies, based on Vilna and Warsaw respectively, were to invade East Prussia. Russia's military preparations between 26 and 29 July attracted much attention in Germany. Even from a purely military point of view, there was no necessity for the Russian mobilization order
Business · Character (mathematics · Declaration · Economic history · Economic policy · Government (linguistics · Mobilization · Political economy · Political science · Russian federation · Sociology · State (computer science · Computer Science · European history and politics · Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics · History · Law · Polish Historical and Cultural Studies
| Citations per year | 0.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1969 - 2022 (54) |
| Highly cited | No |