The Egyptian Military Defeat of 1967

Studies on the military dimensions of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War have failed to establish many direct links with the 1967 conflict. The failure has proved most pronounced in the Egyptian case, because western scholarship still tends to focus on developments in the Israeli army to the culpable neglect of the Egyptian military. Yet, after their resounding defeat in 1967, the Egyptians faced the difficult challenge of rebuilding their shattered armed forces, and the direction of reforms would in large measure be determined by the painful experience of 1967. Unlike many previous studies on military aspects of the ArabIsraeli conflict, this article relies on both Egyptian and Israeli military sources to help analyse the reasons behind the Israeli success in defeating the Egyptian army in 1967. Special attention, however, is given to the Egyptian perspective so as to identify major areas the Egyptians would have to correct for the next conflict in 1973. Among the most prominent Egyptian writers used in this study are General Muhammad Fawzi, Chief of the General Staff in 1967 and then Commander-in-Chief between 1967 and 1971; General 'Abd alMohsen Kamal Murtagui, the front commander in the 1967 war; Lieutenant General Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, the commandant of the Nasir Higher Military Academy before the Six Day War; and Amin Huwaydi, Minister of War from 1967 to 1968. These military writers have critically analysed the numerous internal problems that plagued the Egyptian military before and during the war. This article addresses selected key issues that directly affected the outcome of the

Ancient history · Political science · History · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Middle East Politics and Society

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