Red Scare, 1936
Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10075262 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas Little (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 291-314 |
| Publication date | 1988-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200948802300208 |
| OpenAlex | W2024674598 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Simpson or the forthcoming Olympic Games in Berlin than in Italian aggression in Ethiopia or German reoccupation of the Rhineland. Whitehall seemed nearly as oblivious to the fascist menace as the man in the street. Certainly, some British policy-makers did sound the alarm against Mussolini and Hitler, but most were preoccupied with a more insidious threat to Britain's security. From Lisbon, Paris and Athens came signs that Stalin and his Communist International (Comintern) were bent on spreading Bolshevism throughout the Mediterranean basin, extending Soviet influence from the Atlantic to the Aegean and, perhaps, even snapping the British Empire's historic lifeline, which stretched from Gibraltar to Suez. The most disturbing omens, however, came from Madrid. There a left-wing republican coalition endorsed by the Kremlin had won a narrow victory at the polls in February, only to usher in what some Britons termed a 'Kerensky' era of deepening political and economic turmoil, which by July seemed ripe for a Spanish Lenin. When, instead, General Francisco Franco staged a military uprising, Britain quickly proclaimed a policy of strict non-intervention in the ensuing civil war. Why did it do so? This essay suggests that Whitehall imposed an arms embargo on the Spanish Republic primarily to prevent the emergence of a communist Spain, and more broadly, to check the spread of Bolshevism in western and southern Europe. Most explanations of British non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War minimize such ideological considerations and focus rather upon broader diplomatic factors, such as the quest for collective security or the fear of a wider conflagration. Early accounts by Patricia van der Esch and William Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt contended
Ancient history · Archaeology · Communism · Economic history · Empire · German · Ideology · Intervention (counseling · Political science · Politics · Spanish Civil War · Surrender · Victory · History · Law · Spanish History and Politics
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2016 (25) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |