The Political Allocation of Mineral Rights
A Re–Evaluation of Teapot Dome
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10097407 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary D Libecap (University of Arizona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 381-391 |
| Publication date | 1984-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050700031995 |
| OpenAlex | W2048921836 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 7 |
This paper re–examines the naval reserve oil leases issued by Interior Secretary Fall in 1922 that led to the Teapot Dome controversy. The analysis shows that the leases were the only efficient oil rights arrangement on federal lands through 1930. They were superior to either the naval oil storage policy practiced prior to 1922 or to the general leasing practices found on other federal land. Nevertheless, they were attacked by conservation groups and small oil firms and cancelled in 1922. To explain the opposition to the leases, this paper examines interagency and interest group rivalries for control of federal land. During the period preceding Teapot Dome, the federal government began withholding title to vast tracts of land, and issues of agency jurisdiction and interest group access had not been resolved. The paper concludes that Teapot Dome had little to do with oil conservation and more to do with settling jurisdictional disputes over federal land. The Teapot Dome controversy led to the establishment of the Federal Oil Conservation Board
Dome (geology · Geomorphology · Jurisdiction · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · American Environmental and Regional History · Geology · Law · Public Administration
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| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1986 - 2025 (40) |
| Highly cited | No |