Central Planning and Unintended Consequences
Creating the Soviet Financial System, 1930–1939
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10101753 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Paul R Gregory (University of Houston, autor de correspondencia), Aleksei Tikhonov (University of Houston) |
| Año | 2000 |
| Volumen | 60 |
| Número | 04 |
| Páginas | 1017-1040 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2000-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050700000437 |
| OpenAlex | W4236231943 |
| Idioma | EN |
We use the Soviet state and party archives to study the creation of the Soviet financial system. Although its framers intended to centralize all emission and monitoring of money and credit, in practice the system was characterized by informal mechanisms involving multiple players, soft budget constraints, and massive moral hazards. Enterprises issued “illegal” commercial credits and surrogate monies, causing liquidity growth to far outpace real economic activity. When confronted with the choice of solvency versus plan fulfillment, firms always chose the latter: credit risks were passed on to solvent enterprises, the state bank, and the state budget
Business · Financial plan · Political science · Unintended consequences · European history and politics · Finance · Law · Post-Communist Economic and Political Transition · Urbanization and City Planning
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |