Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926–1933
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10104525 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Barbezat (0009-0008-3606-1653, Amherst College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 435-447 |
| Publication date | 1989-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050700008044 |
| OpenAlex | W2111425184 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 6 |
The International Steel Cartel of 1926 was a necessary step toward a coordinated system of cartels to govern steel exports. Like the present industrial policies of the European Community, however, differences in the aims of the domestic industries caused rivalry among the members of the 1926 agreement. Although thecartel was not able to fix its members' production shares, it was able to limit tradebetween them, which allowed for the formation and operation of their domesticcartels
Business · Cartel · Collusion · Economics · Industrial organization · International economics · International trade · Limit (mathematics · Microeconomics · Production (economics · Rivalry · Corporate Governance and Law · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 2024 (29) |
| Highly cited | No |