The case of ‘payment-by-results’
Re-examining the effects of an incentive programme in nineteenth-century English schools
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10106320 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Huriya Jabbar (0000-0002-5496-4863, University of California, Berkeley, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2013 |
| Volumen | 45 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 220-243 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2013-06-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Educational Administration & History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0620 • E-ISSN: 1478-7431 |
| Editorial | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00220620.2013.796912 |
| OpenAlex | W2170249504 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 41 |
Performance-based management is a recurring and controversial strategy for education reform. This paper examines a nineteenth-century English experiment in paying schools by results and uses concepts from personnel and behavioural economics to understand its decline. Like many recent education reforms, payment-by-results sought to bring schools and teachers under the ‘laws of supply and demand’. The unintended outcomes of the policy, which ultimately led to its end, included narrowing of the curriculum, cheating and manipulation by schoolteachers and managers, and increased risk and uncertainty in the teaching profession. The paper begins by exploring the role of economics principles in the drafting of the policy. It continues to explore how the programme unravelled, with special attention to issues of perverse incentives, teacher motivation, risk, and uncertainty. Building on recent studies of analogous modern experiments in performance-based management, this paper finds important parallels to current policy concerns. The lessons learned address the fundamental relationship between incentives and teacher motivation and the role of economic theory in education policy
Cheating · Curriculum · Economic growth · Economics · Education policy · Higher education · Incentive · Parallels · Payment · Pedagogy · Political science · Public economics · Public relations · Sociology · Unintended consequences · Accounting Education and Careers · Finance · Law · Psychology · School Choice and Performance · Social Psychology · Teacher Education and Leadership Studies
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Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior
The Managerial State
School Wars
Teacher performance pay
The Cult of Efficiency in Education
Economics imperialism’, education policy and educational theory
Market-Driven Education Reform and the Racial Politics of Advocacy
Serious doubts about school effectiveness
Improving exam results, but to what end? The limitations of New Labour's control mechanism for schools
The pendulum swings
The reluctant state and the beginning of the end of state education
Teachers and the State
You Get What You Pay For
Robert Lowe and Education
Educational Documents
Job Market Signaling
The "What" and "Why" of Goal Pursuits
Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity
A Public Management for All Seasons
Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist
School Teacher
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |