Coalition behaviour in n‐person conflicts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10142133 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Gordon Cassidy (Queen's University, corresponding author), J Mangold |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 61-82 |
| Publication date | 1975-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0022250x.1975.9989844 |
| OpenAlex | W1978625219 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
This paper presents a theory of behaviour in n‐person conflicts. The theory and its solution are predicated on the inter‐dependency of coalition formation and pay‐off determination in an n‐person conflict. The solution, therefore, involves not only pay‐off determination but also coalition formation in the game. The theory is developed using mathematical notions of fixed points together with some behavioural theories about choice behaviour and interdependency of persons in competitive situations. It predicts not only the final state of coalition formation but also transient choices and coalitions in the games. Finally, the model is tested on some experimental games of W. Riker
Algorithm · Dependency (UML · Economics · Game theory · Interdependence · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Sociology · State (computer science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
The study of coalition behavior
The theory of political coalitions.
Power-Dependence Relations
Power-Dependence Relations
A revision of Caplow's coalition theory
A Theory of Coalition Formation
An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation
Utility and Choice in Social Interaction
A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
Resolving the Condorcet Paradox
Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
| Highly cited | No |
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