Restricted access in exchange systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10142151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Norman Braun (Bern University of Applied Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 129-148 |
| Publication date | 1994-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0022250x.1994.9990139 |
| OpenAlex | W2049810382 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 23 |
A generalized version of Coleman's rational choice model for pure exchange in a perfectly competitive setting is extended by introducing the possibility of imperfect access between actors. Imperfect access is assumed to affect the individual opportunity set for purchasing control over more interesting resources. Starting from this conceptualization, the effects of restricted access on the central outcomes of exchange are studied without leaving the general equilibrium framework. Structural variables such as actor dependency, prestige, centrality, and status are specified for exchange situations with imperfect access between competing market participants. Notes An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Public Choice Meetings, New Orleans, March 1992. I would like to thank Josef Brüderl, James Coleman, Roger Gould, Scott Feld, Edward Laumann, Werner Raub and Jeroen Weesie for valuable comments and helpful discussions. Suggestions of participants of the Mathematical Sociology Seminar at the University of Chicago are also gratefully acknowledged
Conceptualization · Economics · Imperfect · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Prestige · Social exchange theory · Social science · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy
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| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,21 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2018 (27) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |