Employment Intermediaries

A Model of Firm Incentives

Bibliographic Data

ID10142344
AuthorsDebra Hevenstone (0000-0001-9555-2497, University of Michigan, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume33
Issue1
Pages1-37
Publication date2008-12-22
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00222500802534280
OpenAlexW2078072720
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited36

This paper introduces a micro-simulation of job-worker matching with intermediaries (i.e., temp agencies). While many suggest that firms hire workers through intermediaries to save money on compensation, this paper finds that in a world of limited information and geographically limited job search, intermediaries' human resources ability could be a strong enough incentive, independent of compensation. The study also has some auxiliary findings showing that traditional fee structures encourage firms to use intermediaries for low-skill hires and that firms are more likely to use intermediaries when there is more worker heterogeneity. In the empirical analysis, it becomes clear that studies' estimates of indirect employment in the United States are inconsistent, partly because individuals are uncertain of their contractual status and their employer

Business · Compensation (psychology · Economics · Financial intermediary · Incentive · Industrial organization · Intermediary · Labour economics · Matching (statistics · Microeconomics · Employment and Welfare Studies · Finance · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Marketing

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