The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice

Bibliographic Data

ID10142356
AuthorsTh Bezembinder (corresponding author), P van Acker (University of Liège)
Year1985
Volume11
Issue2
Pages131-158
Publication date1985-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0022250x.1985.9989986
OpenAlexW1983020818
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited13

Let Q,I,J be sets of social goods, aspects and individuals, respectively, and consider the functions v: Q×I×J ? {‐1,1} and w: Q×J ? {‐1,1}. We study two 2‐stage methods for ordering Q characterized by majority vote and, respectively, amalgamating v first over I and then over J (method IP) or vice versa (method PI). An Ostrogorski paradox occurs when IP and PI give different outcomes. Conditions for this paradox and its relations to Condorcet's paradox are investigated, particularly via a scalogram structure of w. While PI seems more like direct democracy than IP, for decisions on k ≥ 3 social goods PI is transitive whereas IP may give a cyclic outcome. Extensions to richer than binary data and to decision systems different from majority vote are explored

Binary relation · Combinatorics · Condorcet method · Data mining · Discrete mathematics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Relation (database · Social choice theory · Transitive relation · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics

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