Sudden-death aversion
Avoiding superior options because they feel riskier
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10155261 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jesse Walker (0000-0003-2652-6177, Cornell University, autor correspondente), Jane L Risen (0000-0003-4879-1705, University of Chicago), Thomas Gilovich (0000-0002-4452-3626, Cornell University), Richard H Thaler (0000-0001-7550-2855, University of Chicago), Richard Thaler |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 363-378 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-01-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315 |
| Editora | American Psychological Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1037/pspa0000106 |
| PMID | 29337583 |
| OpenAlex | W2783873975 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 29 |
We present evidence of sudden-death aversion (SDA)-the tendency to avoid "fast" strategies that provide a greater chance of success, but include the possibility of immediate defeat, in favor of "slow" strategies that reduce the possibility of losing quickly, but have lower odds of ultimate success. Using a combination of archival analyses and controlled experiments, we explore the psychology behind SDA. First, we provide evidence for SDA and its cost to decision makers by tabulating how often NFL teams send games into overtime by kicking an extra point rather than going for the 2-point conversion (Study 1) and how often NBA teams attempt potentially game-tying 2-point shots rather than potentially game-winning 3-pointers (Study 2). To confirm that SDA is not limited to sports, we demonstrate SDA in a military scenario (Study 3). We then explore two mechanisms that contribute to SDA: myopic loss aversion and concerns about "tempting fate." Studies 4 and 5 show that SDA is due, in part, to myopic loss aversion, such that decision makers narrow the decision frame, paying attention to the prospect of immediate loss with the "fast" strategy, but not the downstream consequences of the "slow" strategy. Study 6 finds that people are more pessimistic about a risky strategy that needn't be pursued (opting for sudden death) than the same strategy that must be pursued. We end by discussing how these twin mechanisms lead to differential expectations of blame from the self and others, and how SDA influences decisions in several different walks of life. (PsycINFO Database Record
Blame · Economics · Loss aversion · Microeconomics · Odds · Pessimism · Point (geometry · Tying · Behavioral Health and Interventions · Computer Science · Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency
The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking
Norm theory
Associative processes in intuitive judgment
The ostrich effect
Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers
An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods
Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation
The Disjunction Effect in Choice under Uncertainty
Believing what we do not believe
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking
Advances in prospect theory
Judgment under Uncertainty
Information Avoidance
Choices, values, and frames
Mental accounting matters
Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football
The spotlight effect in social judgment
Another look at why people are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets
Why people are reluctant to tempt fate
The Nature of the Firm
Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption
Hypothesis-Consistent Testing and Semantic Priming in the Anchoring Paradigm
The illusion of transparency
On the pursuit and misuse of useless information
When the head protects the heart
The psychology of doing nothing
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |