Advance‐Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10172046
AutoresJ D Dana (0000-0002-1997-1427, autor de correspondencia), Jr James D Dana
Año1998
Volumen106
Número2
Páginas395-422
Fecha de publicación1998-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
EditorialUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/250014
OpenAlexW2037923745
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas3

When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price‐taking firms may offer advance‐purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance‐purchase sales are made to low‐valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second‐degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power

Aggregate demand · Business · Economics · Incentive · Market power · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monopoly · Price discrimination · Valuation (finance · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Supply Chain and Inventory Management