Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transactions Costs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10172834 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lee J Alston, Samar K Datta, Jeffrey B Nugent (0000-0003-0986-5847) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 92 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1121-1133 |
| Publication date | 1984-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261277 |
| OpenAlex | W1999832722 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 12 |
The choice between wage labor and sharecrop contracts is analyzed in a model that avoids both the pitfalls of previous models--inefficiency of sharecropping and indeterminacy--by introducing transactions costs with appropriate nonlinearities. Plantation data from the American South provide empirical support for the hypothesized nonlinearity in transactions costs and simultaneous determination of direct supervision and contractual choice
Comparability · Economics · Indeterminacy (philosophy · Industrial organization · Inefficiency · Labour economics · Leasehold estate · Microeconomics · Sharecropping · Transaction cost · Wage · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic theories and models
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| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,78 |
| Citation span | 1985 - 2024 (40) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |