Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10173634 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeremy Bulow (National Bureau of Economic Research), Paul Klemperer (0000-0003-4372-2962, Centre for Economic Policy Research) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 120 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 160-186 |
| Publication date | 2012-02-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/665416 |
| OpenAlex | W2137034103 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 10 |
Price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent-seeking. The misallocation effect alone ensures that a price control always reduces consumer surplus in an otherwise-competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand; or with log-convex demand (e.g., constantelasticity) even if supply is inelastic. The same results apply whether rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery, or whether costly rent-seeking and/or partial decontrol mitigates the inefficiency. Our analysis exploits the observation that in any market, consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal revenue curve
Demand curve · Economic surplus · Economics · Inefficiency · Marginal cost · Marginal revenue · Market demand schedule · Microeconomics · Price elasticity of demand · Price elasticity of supply · Revenue · Supply and demand · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Economic theories and models · Merger and Competition Analysis
The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality
An income-distributional analysis of the rent control subsidy
Gainers and Losers in Priority Services
Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple
Housing Market Spillovers
Protection or provocation? The effect of tenant protection regulation
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2024 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |