Bilateral Trading as an Efficient Auction over Time
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10174733 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Donald R Deere (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 100-115 |
| Publication date | 1988-02-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261526 |
| OpenAlex | W1990942646 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
A market composed of pairwise trading under incomplete information is modeled in order to analyze how resources are allocated among competing uses when information about trade gains is incomplete. Contrary to the results from studying a single such trade, sufficient homogeneity across potential trades guarantees that efficiency obtains. This is analogous to simple first-price auctions with homogeneous bidders, where bidders have a common bid function and, as a result, the high bidder also places the highest value on the auctioned object. With enough symmetry, the decentralized bilateral trades in the present model occur as if they were made in a first-price auction that occurs through time. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press
Auction theory · Common value auction · Complete information · Dutch auction · Economics · English auction · Generalized second-price auction · Homogeneous · Microeconomics · Pairwise comparison · Revenue equivalence · Robustness (evolution · Unique bid auction · Vickrey auction · Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
| Highly cited | No |
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