The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited--Again
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10177832 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James D Reid (0000-0002-6125-4472, corresponding author), Joseph D Reid Joseph D Reid |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 403-407 |
| Publication date | 1977-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/260571 |
| OpenAlex | W2098706635 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 34 |
| References cited | 3 |
In fact, share-farmed lands yield as much as rented or owner-cultivated lands. In traditional theory, share-farmed lands yield less, for share tenants stint their efforts. This article shows that economists' standard assumptions about a market equilibrium reconcile theory with fact: when contracts are enforced, share farmers labor as diligently as others. Evidence is advanced that gain from the joining of tenant and landlord interests, not gain from the dispersion of agricultural risk, is the impetus to share tenancy
Agriculture · Business · Economics · Landlord · Leasehold estate · Market share · Microeconomics · Political science · Sharecropping · Yield (engineering · Finance · Land Rights and Reforms · Law
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts
A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
Theories of Sharecropping
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions
Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization
Rural Credit Markets
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions
Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl
Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
Credit and Agrarian Class Structure
The puzzle of sharecropping
A framework for the analysis of evolving patron-client ties in agrarian economies
Cultivation techniques as a response to risk in early Canadian prairie agriculture
Tenure choice in Southern agriculture, 1930–1960
Property rights in economic history
Share contracting for California Gold
The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany
The Dependent Tenant
Sharecropping
Sharecropping and productivity
Sharecropping and Investment in Agriculture in Early Modern France
The Theory of Sharecropping
The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action
The economics of tenancy in early twentieth-century southern Italy
| Unique citing works | 34 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 2012 (35) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 34 |