Collusion in Ocean Shipping
A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10178445 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Sjostrom (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1160-1179 |
| Publication date | 1989-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261647 |
| OpenAlex | W2079113807 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 6 |
In markets with avoidable fixed costs, the core may be empty. The author argues that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists. He sets up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compares those implications with those of a cartel model. The author compares the two models empirically with data from liner shipping conferences, legal collusive agreements that have been in force for over a century, and concludes that the evidence supports the theory of the core. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
Cartel · Collusion · Competition (biology · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Set (abstract data type · Test (biology · Computer Science · Global trade and economics · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis
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Price-fixing Overcharges
Passenger Shipping Cartels and Their Effect on Trans-Atlantic Migration
U.S. Ocean Shipping Policy
Price-Fixing Overcharges
Antitrust and Business Activity
The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,31 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2023 (30) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |