Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10179211 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John Garen (0000-0002-4641-8811, autor correspondente), John E Garen |
| Ano | 1994 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Fascículo | 6 |
| Páginas | 1175-1199 |
| Data de publicação | 1994-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Editora | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261967 |
| OpenAlex | W2048644900 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 24 |
| Referências citadas | 2 |
The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple principal-agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries. Many findings are consistent with the basic intuition of principle-agent models that compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insurance. However, statistical significance for some of the effects is weak, although the magnitudes are large. Nevertheless, it seems clear that principle-agent considerations play a role in setting executive compensation. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press
Compensation (psychology · Econometrics · Economics · Empirical evidence · Executive compensation · Executive summary · Incentive · Intuition · Management · Microeconomics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Finance · Financial Reporting and Valuation Research · Psychology · Social Psychology
Policy Entrepreneurship at the Street Level
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Gendered cooperation in a post-NPM era
Conditional Cash Incentive and Use of Health Care Services
Too Much Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Board interlocking network and the design of executive compensation packages
Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance
Who should be the principal of innovation
The impact of ESG performance on corporate digital transformation
Public procurement and European Union integration
Privatization and ‘Agentification’ of Public Services Delivery in Africa
La fiscalité des stock options
Income Taxes and the Composition of Pay
Shareholder Wealth and Wages
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Making Incentive Systems Work
Management compensation and corporate governance reform in China
Victims of Corruption Suffer Personal and Collective Loss
Politicians’ involvement in street-level policy implementation
An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority
The Agency Relationship in Churches
| Obras citantes distintas | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,83 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1997 - 2025 (29) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 24 |