Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions
On the Persistence of Inefficiencies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10179360 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Armando Gomes (0000-0002-1755-1154, California University of Pennsylvania), Philippe Jehiel (0000-0003-2327-3186, University College London) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 626-667 |
| Publication date | 2005-05-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/429136 |
| OpenAlex | W3124118884 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 26 |
An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a coalition, a feasible new state to move the economy to, and side payments between the agents in the coalition. The setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining, coalition formation, or exchange economies. Whenever agents are unable to write long‐term contracts, but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude, there can be long‐run inefficiencies (with cycles or inefficient steady states). However, when agents are sufficiently patient, the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run. Moreover, when there exists an efficient state that is free of negative externalities (in the sense that a move away from that state does not hurt the agents whose consent is not required for the move), the system must converge to this efficient state in the long run. It is thus more important to design institutions guaranteeing the existence of an efficient negative externality–free state than to implement a fine initialization of the process
Economics · Externality · Initialization · Microeconomics · Payment · Process (computing · State (computer science · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Finance · Game Theory and Voting Systems
Strategic alliances in a veto game
Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining
The option of sequential alliances for cooperative investments
Collective hold‐up
The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution
Coalitional Games, Excessive Competition and a Lack of Trust
Political Economy in a Changing World
Bargaining and Majority Rules
Mistakes in Cooperation
Do Auctions Select Efficient Firms
Coalitions
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Bargaining in Legislatures
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |