On the Design of Hierarchies
Coordination versus Specialization
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10180446 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Hart (0000-0002-5391-7483, London School of Economics and Political Science), John Moore (0000-0003-4566-6247, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 675-702 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/431794 |
| OpenAlex | W3124635098 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 19 |
We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents have ideas, but these ideas conflict. We suppose that decision‐making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain of command, and the most senior person with an idea exercises authority. We analyze the optimal hierarchical structure given that some agents coordinate and other specialize. Among other things, our theory explains why coordinators should typically be senior to specialists and why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Our theory also throws light on the optimal degree of decentralization inside a firm and on firm boundaries
Asset (computer security · Business · Computer security · Decentralization · Economics · Hierarchical organization · Hierarchy · Management · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Business Strategy and Innovation · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions
Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope
Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract
The Organization of Firms Across Countries
Government-subsidized R&D and firm innovation
Réglementation et avenir du travail
Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending
Evolving power and environmental policy
The allocation mechanism of authority and accountability in Chinese government hierarchies
Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives
Causes of industrial land-use regulations in China
Externality as a coordination problem
Management Buyouts, Supervision and Employee Discretion
Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm
A theory of organizational choice
The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload
Strategy and Structure
Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
Strategy and Structure
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size
Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production
Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,8 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2024 (19) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |