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An Extension of Optimality Criteria

An Axiomatic Approach to Institutional Choice

Bibliographic Data

ID10181771
AuthorsBlaine Roberts (corresponding author)
Year1973
Volume81
Issue2, Part 1
Pages386-400
Publication date1973-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/260034
OpenAlexW1998935541
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited9

An argument by Buchanan that the criterion of Pareto optimality is of little value when used solely with traditional economic variables is expanded and developed formally in an axiomatic framework of individual choice. Individual decisions are first aggregated to group decisions, and then group decisions are aggregated to give social decisions. Social decisions are compared with the Pareto-optimal conditions for social choice. Finally, there is a short discussion of the implications for the study of social choice and institutional change

Argument (complex analysis · Axiom · Axiomatic system · Econometrics · Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Group (periodic table · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Microeconomics · Multi-objective optimization · Operations management · Pareto optimal · Pareto principle · Social choice theory · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics

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Unique citing works5
Citations per year0.1
Citation span1974 - 2020 (47)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

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