Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve

Bibliographic Data

ID10182249
AuthorsJames M Buchanan, Dwight R Lee
Year1982
Volume90
Issue4
Pages816-819
Publication date1982-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/261091
OpenAlexW2064677081
LanguageEN
Citations received19
References cited1

Why should a rationally motivated political decision process generate an inverse relationship between tax rates and tax revenues? There would never seem a logical reason for increasing tax rates beyond maximum revenue limits. In this note, we explain how such a position can emerge and show why, once in such a position, political decision makers may find it difficult to escape

Economics · Laffer curve · Microeconomics · Political process · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Public economics · Revenue · State income tax · Tax reform · Tax revenue · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law

  • Policy Challenges and Political Responses

    Robert D Tollison, William F Shughart et al.•Policy Challenges and Political…•2005

  • Quebec prosperity

    Fred McMahon•Quebec prosperity•2003

  • Government response to increased demand for public services

    Open Access•Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones•European Journal of Political…•2021

  • Estimating property tax base elasticity over time

    Open Access•WilliamF Stine•Public Choice•1988

  • Politics, deficits, and the Laffer curve

    Open Access•RogerN Waud•Public Choice•1985

  • The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard

    Bruno S Frey, Felix Oberholzer‐Gee et al.•Journal of Political Economy•1996

  • Morality, Individuals and Collectives

    Open Access•Keith Graham•Royal Institute of Philosophy…•1987

  • The Fiscal Autonomy of Deciders

    Open Access•Matthew Digiuseppe•Foreign Policy Analysis•2014

  • Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States

    Open Access•Phillip W Magne, Phillip Magne•Constitutional Political Economy•2008

  • Impact of land revenue on the urban land growth toward decreasing population density in Jiangsu Province, China

    Open Access•Taiyang Zhong, Yuqiong Chen et al.•Habitat International•2016

  • Public debt stabilization

    Open Access•Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Marco Di Pietro et al.•Public Choice•2018

  • Government growth in the twenty-first century

    Open Access•Randall G Holcombe•Public Choice•2005

  • Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats

    Open Access•Randall G Holcombe, Christopher Boudreaux et al.•Public Choice•2013

  • Reverse revenue sharing

    Open Access•Dwight R Lee•Public Choice•1985

  • The pox of politics

    Open Access•Glenn L Furton•Public Choice•2023

  • Alternative Determination of a Corporate Tax Rate in Selected EU Countries by Using Data Envelopment Analysis

    Open Access•Lukáš Frýd•Politická ekonomie•2017

  • Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of the Minimum Wage

    Russell S Sobel•Journal of Political Economy•1999

  • Doing Well While Intending Good

    Open Access•William C Mitchell, Michael C Munger•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1993

  • Tax Reform as Political Choice

    Open Access•James M Buchanan•The Journal of Economic…•1987

  • Rules Rather than Discretion

    Finn E Kydland, Edward C Prescott•Journal of Political Economy•1977

Unique citing works19
Citations per year0,46
Citation span1985 - 2023 (39)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 19

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae