Trading and Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10182891 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David K Musto (0000-0002-3894-9102, California University of Pennsylvania), Bilge Yılmaz (0000-0003-1173-9399, California University of Pennsylvania) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 990-1003 |
| Publication date | 2003-09-23 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/377086 |
| OpenAlex | W3125847685 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 7 |
Complete financial markets transform the political choice between candidates with different redistribution policies. If redistribution policies do not affect aggregate wealth, then financial trade implies that wealth considerations have no effect on voting and so do not affect who wins. However, an election in which one candidate would redistribute results in redistribution, and redistribution is the same whether or not he wins. Furthermore, he proposes, and if elected carries out, more redistribution than he prefers. If redistribution policies do affect aggregate wealth, then everybody expects more wealth if the candidate with the higher aggregate-wealth policy wins
Affect (linguistics · Economics · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Public good · Redistribution (election · Redistribution of income and wealth · Voting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2018 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |