The Efficiency of Direct Democracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10183065 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eli M Noam (0000-0002-6110-4108, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 803-810 |
| Publication date | 1980-08-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/260903 |
| OpenAlex | W2003128890 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 10 |
The paper investigates the Pareto efficiency of direct democracy and searches for the frequency with which the losing minority in referendum voting could compensate the majority and still be better off. A model is defined that permits the measuring of the intensity of preferences in a population, based on voting and abstention behavior. Using the model, an analysis of over 100 Swiss referenda reveals only a few instances in which the outcome of direct voting is inefficient. It seems that the political system evolves methods of trade-off that permit efficient outcomes in most cases. Criticism of direct democracy should therefore not rely on the primarily hypothetical objection of inefficiency
Criticism · Democracy · Direct democracy · Econometrics · Economics · Inefficiency · Microeconomics · Operations management · Outcome (game theory · Pareto principle · Political science · Politics · Population · Public economics · Referendum · Representative democracy · Sociology · Voting · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
On the Constitutional Supervision System of Chinese-Style Democracy
On the optimality of direct democracy
Populism's Original Sin
Populism’s original sin
Interest Groups, Referenda, and the Political Process
Public preferences for economic policies
Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout
Initiatives, referendums, and the tax state
Ideological beasts or effective organizations? Do voters’ views of democracy affect their expectations of political parties
The Janus‐Face of Negociation Democracy. The Effects of Consensus Democracy, Direct Democracy and Decentralization on State Intervention in Swiss Cantons
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Voting and Collective Choice
Some simple economics of voting and not voting
Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process
Policy Making by Plebiscite
Problems of Majority Voting
Notes on Welfare Economics and the Theory of Democracy
Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization
The Capabilites of Voting Rules in the Absence of Coalitions
Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions
| Citations per year | 0.22 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1981 - 2026 (46) |
| Highly cited | No |