The Conservation Multiplier
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10184225 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bård Harstad (University of Oslo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1731-1771 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/723637 |
| OpenAlex | W3171377604 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 37 |
EvEvery government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a model of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government will exploit has a multiplier effect on earlier decisions. The multiplier can be taken advantage of by a lobby paying for exploitation, or by a donor compensating for conservation. The analysis also uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the president, the party in power, the general public, or to the lobby group
Computer security · Economics · Exploit · Government (linguistics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Multiplier (economics · Public economics · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
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| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |