Bureaucratic Selection and Weberian Values

Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Indonesia

Bibliographic Data

ID10188717
AuthorsNicholas Kuiper (0000-0001-5733-6400, Princeton University, corresponding author), Nicholas Kuipers
Year2024
Volume88
Issue1
Pages000-000
Publication date2024-12-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/734258
OpenAlexW4405311779
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited34

The meritocratic recruitment of bureaucrats is thought to promote “Weberian” values through two distinct properties. The first concerns the use of examinations to sort aspirants on the basis of traits considered desirable for bureaucrats. The second relates to nondiscretionary selection, whereby recruits do not owe their position to a politician’s patronage, making them less likely to be captured. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment among aspirants to the Indonesian bureaucracy, I disentangle the relative importance of these mechanisms by manipulating how “public officials” are chosen from groups to perform tasks on behalf of others. I find no differences on tasks gauging commitment to Weberian values across public officials selected via the merit system or lotteries—although both perform better than those selected under patronage. Because both the merit system and lotteries are nondiscretionary, the results question examinations as the ideal tool for selecting bureaucrats

Bureaucracy · Field (mathematics · Political science · Politics · Selection (genetic algorithm · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics

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