The Battle of Tanga, 2-5 November 1914
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10221496 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ross Anderson (0000-0001-8697-5682, University of Glasgow), Ross Gilbert Anderson (University of Glasgow, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 294-322 |
| Publication date | 2001-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | War in History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0968-3445 • E-ISSN: 1477-0385 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/096834450100800303 |
| OpenAlex | W2015659492 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The battle of Tanga, lasting from 2 to 5 November 1914, between the British and Germans was the opening clash in a relatively little-known campaign that was to last over four years. It was conceived as part of a wider plan to ensure British maritime superiority in the Indian Ocean as well as depriving the Germans of their system of overseas wireless transmission stations. However, through a lack of considered analysis and departmental ambitions, it evolved into an ill-thought-out attempt to seize the whole of German East Africa with two brigades of the Indian army. The landings at Tanga were compromised by the need to renounce a local truce, followed by the dilatory disembarkation of the fighting troops. A rapid attempt to take the town was bloodily repulsed by the German defenders and a second, more deliberate attack was similarly defeated. Fearing a greater catastrophe, the British force withdrew to British East Africa and assumed a defensive posture. The affair highlighted a number of weaknesses and defects in British training and operational readiness for modern war
Ancient history · Archaeology · Battle · Economic history · Geography · German · Plan (archaeology · Political science · African history and culture studies · Global Maritime and Colonial Histories · History
| Citations per year | 0.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |