The Road to Party Politics in Iran (1979–2009)

The primary aim of this article is to examine the policies of the elite in Iran in relation to political parties and organizations that have emerged between 1979 and 2009. It also attempts to argue that the politics of factionalism has proven to be incapable of creating a viable political system. On the other hand, it has been difficult to anticipate the emergence of a system based on party politics in Iran more than three decades after the revolution. The findings of this article demonstrate how determined the elite were in shaping politics in Iran, and will also show that the move away from factionalism to a system based on party politics between 1997 and 2009 faced stiff opposition from the conservative elite. The situation polarized politics in Iran and further increased intra-elite factionalism. This article relies mostly on Iranian primary sources, accessing opinions that have not yet been published or discussed. The focus is on examining the relationship between high-ranking members of the elite and organizations representing different interests within the system that came to existence either before or immediately after the revolution in 1979. Notes 1. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992), pp.xiii, 3 and 42. 2. Since 1979, Iranian politics has been dominated by Shi'a clerics and religious lay persons divided into two main ideological factions, sub-divided in turn into several smaller factions. Despite the shift of power between the two main factions, the real power remained in the hand of Ayatollah Khomeini and then his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i. The concept of 'ruling elite' in this article refers to both main factions. However, divisions between the two sides have widened since 1997, and the political boundaries have become increasingly transparent around two opposing poles. From 2003 onwards, the ultra-conservatives emerged, comprised of the Supreme Leader's own office (bayt-e rahbary), his vast network of officials and advisors linked to him directly as well as Friday Emams, several nationwide foundations, and his representative in each provinces. The Leader strengthened his link with the traditional conservatives and from 2003 he forged strong ties with the revolutionary guard and the intelligence forces as an alternative to reformists. The birth of the Principalists (Osulgarayan) headed by Ahmadinajad during the 2003 local election brought into power a new brand of ultra-conservatism, wiped out the reformists from power and marginalized moderate conservatives from 2005. This process of dismantling power-sharing continued and reached a pivotal point during the 2009 presidential election, where the coalition of the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad dominated politics). 3. A. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921 (London and New York: Pearson Education, 2003), p.12. 4. M. Malekzadeh, Tarikh-e Enghlab-e Mshrutiyat-e Iran, Vols.6 and 7 (Tehran: Elmi, 1373/1994), pp.1328–9). Party views were published in Iran-e no for the democratic party and Enghlab for the conservative party (ibid.). 5. During the same period, Iran had several other party organizations such as Democratic Party of Azarbijan (established in 1945, with close links to Tudeh party) and the National Will Party (headed by Seyed Ziaodin in 1943). 6. Melliyun and Mardom parties were formed by Asadollah A'lam and Manochehr Eghbal in 1957. From 1964, Iran-e novin party became the dominant party until 1975, which the Shah created the Rastakhiz Party. However, all three parties largely remained elitist parties with limited members. 7. N.R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2003), p.166. 8. Ibid., p.49. 9. The Pro Line of Emam supporters emerged after the revolution and when the IRP was established. Their members were closely identified with Khomeini's policies. This faction was distinct from other factions for its absolute obedience to Khomeini's leadership and his opposition to social and political freedoms under the pretext that they were manifestations of liberal democracy. When the IRP was dissolved by Khomeini, the ACC and the OEIR were amongst the factions claimed to be Pro Line of Emam. 10. The ACC was founded on 20 March 1988, when some members of the Followers of the Line of Emam, among them Mehdi Karrubi, Mahmoud Doai' and Ali Akbar Musavi Kho'eyniha, broke-away from the CCA (see Keyhan, 26 March 1988 and E'temad, 25 Azar 1386/2007). The first secretary of the CCA was Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani and the ACC's first secretary was Mehdi Karrubi who resigned during the ninth presidential election in 2005 and formed the National Confidence Party (hezb-e e'temad-e melli). 11. In the view of Kazem Alamdari, Khomeini's death was the end of a populist system and the start of a clientelist system which was slowly replaced with a few leaders. See K. Alamdari, 'Hamiparvary, moshakhase-ye ghodrat-e siyasi', Iran-e farad, Vol.44 (1377/1998), p.10. 12. Hamshahri, 4 Azar 1376/1997. Also see M. Mohammadi, 'Gozar as mahfel be hezb', Iran-e farad, Vol.56 (1378/1999), pp.19–20. 13. In a gathering at Sharif University, Rafsanjani claimed that the SOR was formed when in his absence the CCA decided not to nominate the moderates (pro-Rafsanjani) for the fifth Majles election in 1996. The SOR obtained permission from the Article 10 Commission on 25 Mordad 1378/1999 (see Fars, 2 Azar and Kargozaran, 3 Azar 1387/2008). 14. According to Mohammad Javad Haqshenas, an official in the Interior Ministry from May 1997 to March 2000, about 100 political parties obtained registration. See K. Sardar-abadi, 'Gozar be towse'e siyasi', Aftab Magazine, No.22 (Bahman 1381/2002), p.53. 15. BBC Persian.com (accessed 11 June 2003). 16. Amongst them, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli as well as the deputy speaker, Mohammad Hasan Abutorabi. (See www.roozonline and ISNA, 5 Mordad 1388/27 July 2009.) 17. Part of their financial support comes from government (Yaraneh). Since 2005, Ahmadinejad put an end to this process but shifted his weight towards pro-government organizations. Prior to the tenth presidential election, he was accused of spending cash from the budget to gather support for his own faction. (See Aftab e Yazd, 3 Khordad 1388/24 May 2009, Sarmayeh and E'temad, 5 Khordad 1388). For a more thorough investigation on how different influential bodies and figures accessed cash see R. Razavi, 'The Politics of Reform in Iran (1997–2005): The Development of the Electoral Processes, the Rise of Political Movements and the Evolution of Civil Society' (PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 2008), pp.259–61. 18. The ICS, Resalat, the NCP, E'temad-e Melli, the CCA, Aftab-e Yazd, the SOR, the OEIR and the IIPF used to publish Kargozaran, Asr-e No, Mosharekat respectively. For a complete table see Razavi, The Politics of Reform, pp.10–13. All factions also hold close links to various religious seminaries and Grand Ayatollah's for spiritual support and religious legitimacy. For example, almost all pro-reform factions are close to Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, moderate conservatives are linked to Rafsanjani and other grand Ayatollahs such as Abdolkarim Musavi Tabrizi and Yousef Sanei' while the Principalists' support comes from Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and Mohammad Yazdi. 19. VOA TV, 17 Aug. 2009. 20. Ibid. 21. D. Brumberg, 'Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia', Political Science Quarterly, Vol.116, No.3 (2001), p.408. 22. Ibid., p.384. 23. This particular point have been picked by scholars such as Mehdi Moslem where he argues that in contrast to the revolutions in the Soviet Union and China (in which factionalism was replaced by a strong central authority) factionalism had increased in Iran, each faction claims its own interpretation of Islam and Islamic government. In Moslem's view, the rise in factions was mainly due to Khomeini's simple emphasis on the Islamicity of the regime did not provide sufficient guidelines to determine the specific politics of the state, that is its socio-cultural policies, the nature of its economic system and its foreign policy orientation. See M. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp.3 and 47. 24. Prior to the 2005 presidential election, Ali Larijani (who was also one of the candidates in the 2005 election) confidently signalled that a sweeping change was on the way and he made it crystal clear that, 'a bipolar establishment (doganegi dar hokumat) could not solve our problems'. See Hambastegi, 14 Bahman 1384/2005. 25. ISNA, 22 Jan. 2000. In a meeting with the Assembly of the Experts, the Supreme Leader, Khamene'i, also emphasized that 'differences of opinion are not a problem, but standing face to face against each other must be avoided' See BBC Persian.com (accessed 10 Sept. 2003). 26. See article 110 of Iranian constitution at http:www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html (accessed 18 June 2007). 27. See the following sources respectively: A. Soroush, Kiyan, No.2 (Nov./Dec. 1991), p.6; No.5 (March/April 1991), p.20 and No.24 (April/May 1995), pp.2–11; Z. Mirhosseini and R. Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp.2 and 130–32; M. Shabestari, 'Din, modara va khoshounat', roundtable discussion with M. Kadivar, Kiyan, No.45 (1999), pp.17–19. 28. Se http://www.emruz.com (accessed 27 July 2009). A letter was sent to Rafsanjani by previous MPs (Majma'e nemayandegan-e adwar-e majles) asking him to review Khamenei's position, http://www.radiofarda.com (accessed 13 Aug. 2009). 29. The summer of 1981 marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new phase in Iranian politics where the first president elect, Abolhasan Bani Sadr was dismissed first by Khomeini and then by the Majles. The move strengthened the clergy's domination to power and put an end to power sharing between traditional religious forces and the liberals. 30. See Rafsanjani's interview with the daily E'temad-e melli, 27 Azar 1386/2007. 31. A long article, entitled 'A Survey of Iran', in The Economist, 18 Jan. 2003, explained the main reason why Khomeini dissolved the IRP; 'when it became difficult to reconcile the IRP views with the exigencies of clerical rule'. 32. E'temad-e melli, 27 Azar 1386/2007. A senior founding member of the IRP, Assadollah Badamchian, also expressed a similar argument and believed that the IRP had served its purpose, which as he put it 'was to save people from falling into the trap of other parties'. Badamchian continued, 'the party's activities came to an end when there was no longer a need to oppose groups that were hostile, and in opposition to the government and the revolution' (Kar va kargar, 5 Oct. 1996). 33. In a meeting with the Society of Islamic students (jam'eh-ye eslami daneshjuyan) Rafsanjani stated, 'we are the most rational government in the world and Iran is the freest environment for the individuals' (ma manteghitarin hokumat-e donya hastim va Iran azadtarin mohit baraye afrad) (Abrar, 24 Esfand 1368/1989). In another occasion Rafsanjani said, 'Iran is a leading democratic country in the region' (Iran pishtaz-e demokrasi dar mantaqeh ast) (IRNA, 1 Azar 1382/2003). 34. Resalat, 13 Feb. 1997. 35. Tehran Times, 16 Feb. 1997. 36. ISNA, 3 Khordad 1383/2004, in an interview with Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour. 37. In a speech in Khomeini's shrine, Tehran Friday prayer Emam Hojatoleslam Ahmad Khatami, stated that Khomeini did not believe in liberal democracy at all (Emam zareh-ye be liberal demokrasi gharbi e'teghadi nadashtand) (Iran, 13 Khordad 1387/2008). 38. Ibid. 39. S. Shafa, Tavalodi digar, 4th edn (no place: Nashr-e Farzad, 1378/1999), p.513. 40. The reformists comprised of different organizations such as the ACC, the OEIR, the IIPF and the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OCU) (daftar-e tahkim-e vahdat). 41. M.K. Firouz, Towse'e siyasi (Tehran: Nashr-e Ghatreh, 1378/1999), p.17. 42. B. Dad, Sad rooz ba Khatami (Tehran: Sahafi, 1377/1998), pp.20–21. 43. H. Aghajari, Hokumat-e dini va hokumat-e demokratic (Tehran: Zekr Publication, 1381/2002), p.117. 44. Iran, 22 Oct. 1996. 45. Iran Daily, 11 Aug. 1997. 46. Iran, 15 Aug. 1997. 47. Amongst them, the Islamic Iran Participation Front published Mosharekat, the Islamic Labour Party published Kar va kargar, the ACC published Aftab, the Solidarity party published Hambastegi and the SOR published Kargozaran. 48. In an interview with Vaghaye etefaghyeh, 15 Tir 1383/2004. 49. Ibid. 50. Resalat, 4 Aug. 1997. In a gathering to celebrate the government week, Khamene'i praised Ahmadinejad's government for its determination in blocking the rise of secularist ideas in the country (Aftab-e yazd, 3 Shahrivar 1387/2008). 51. Akhbar, 21 Jan. 1997. 52. Salam, 10 July 1997. For similar views by Hojatoleslam Mesbah Yazdi's, see Resalat, 6 Day 1369/1990 and Ettela'at, 15 Ordibehesht 1373/1994. Also, Amir Mohebian, Resalat, 15 Azar 1376/1997. 53. While the conservatives had some reservation to recognize political parties, they had no problems creating a number of seasonal organizations in order to advance their own interests. Amongst them, the Prosperity for Islamic Iran (abadgaran-e Iran-e eslami) (PII) (during the seventh parliamentary election in 2004), the Joyful Essence of Obedience (JEO) rayehe-ye khosh-e khedmat (during the 2006 local election) and the Conservatives United Front (CUF) (jebhe-ye motahed-e osulgerayan) formed during the 2008 parliamentary election. 54. Iran, 9 and 10 Oct. 1996. Tehran Friday Pray Emam, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami also expressed similar argument: The activities of political parties are legitimate if those activities are fit within the framework and position of Vali-ye faqih otherwise are illegitimate (agar dastour-e hezbi dar chaharchub-e moze'e vali-ye faqih bashad mashrouiyat darad va dar ghair-e insourat faghed-e mashrouiyat ast) (Kargozaran, 28 Khordad 1387/2008). 55. Ettela'at, 3 Shahrivar 1375/1996. 56. ISNA, 20 Bahman 1382/2003. 57. BBC Persian.com (accessed 28 Sept. 2003). 58. Aftab, 15 May 2004. 59. Keyhan, 31 Mordad 1387/2008. 60. Aftab, 15 Bahman 1385/2007. 61. Aftab, 18 Bahman 1385/2007. In a speech in Qom, Ahmadinejad emphasized that, 'this government doesn't need any political party and I pay not a penny as a ransom to the them' (in dolat heech neyazi be hezb nadarad va man yek rial be ahzab baj nakhaham dad) (ISNA, 15 Shahrivar 1386/2007). 62. Iran, 13 Khordad 1387/2008. 63. Ibid. 64. An MP from Esfahan, Mohammad Karim Shahrzad asked the judiciary to prosecute Mir Hossayn Musavi while another MP, Esmail Kowsari, and a leading figure within the revolutionary guard, Yadollah Javani argued that Musavi, Khatami, Karrubi and others must come to court and be accountable for their actions (see Fars, 20 and 18 Mordad 1388/11 and 9 Aug. 2009, as well as Keyhan, 19 Mordad 1388/10 Aug. 2009). The representative of state prosecutor demanded the court to dissolve (enhelal) the opposition factions such as the IIPF and the OEIR (Iran, 4 Shahrivar 1388/2009). 65. A. Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, Politics and State in the Islamic Republic, translated by J. O'kane (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp.126–7. 66. There are organizations that have been active for many years without applying for a licence, amongst them the CCA, the OCU, the Society of Qom Seminary Teachers (jame'e-ye modaresin-e howzeh-ye 'elmiyeh-ye Qom) the PII and the JEO. 67. As part of promoting party politics, the reformist government was determining to support political organizations financially. But from the 2000, the GC refused to give its support to such policy. The government had to seek other revenues (radifha-ey digar-e budjeh) in order to continue its support for political organizations (see Aftab, 26 Day 1385/2007). For example, the Article 10 Commission issued a statement in November 2003 and asked all political parties and organizations which had obtained the permits until the end of 2002, 'to come forward to get their cash subsidies (yaraneh) from the government'. BBC Persian.com, 6 Nov. 2003. 68. Aria, 20 Ordibehesht 1380/2001. In an interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Secretary General of the Freedom Movement, Ebrahim Yazdi claimed that 'there are no independent political parties in Iran'. 69. Mosharekat, 8 Ordibehesht 1379/2000. There was a similar problem with other organizations such as the OEIR. The OEIR's spokesmen at the time, Mohsen Armin, in an interview with daily Nowrouz said, 'the official members of the OEIR are about 40 to 50 people'. When he was asked about the number of supporters, he responded, 'I do not have a clear idea of the number of supporters' (Nowrouz, 27 Farvardin 1380/2001). 70. E'temad-e melli, 20 Khordad 1387/2008. 71. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Is the Middle East Democratising?', British Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.26, No.2 (1999), p.203. 72. Iran, 21 Ordibehesht 1383/2004. Khatami made a speech in a session between the government and the sixth parliament

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