Soldiers and civilians

The dilemma of Turkish democracy

Bibliographic Data

ID10279455
AuthorsTanel Demirel (corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume40
Issue1
Pages127-150
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueMiddle Eastern Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0026-3206 • E-ISSN: 1743-7881
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00263200412331301927
OpenAlexW2051591892
LanguageEN
Citations received32
References cited5

The military in Turkey continues to wield powers that might be regarded as anomalous for a liberal democracy.' This article aims to shed light on the problematic nature of Turkish civil-military relations. It starts from the assumption that civil-military relations are power relations and for that reason they cannot be properly grasped if one side of the equation is sidestepped. Civil-military relations are power relations because they refer to a conflict about who will have the upper hand when it comes to contentious issues. As in any power relation it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to grasp why one actor behaved in the way it did without looking at the other actor(s). A corollary to that assumption is that neither civilian nor military attitudes occur in a vacuum but they are interdependent. Instead of treating them as a given independent, which has already been formed or crystallized prior to the relationship in question, it is more fruitful to regard them as products of constant interaction and a network of relations. They are to be seen as related and part of a process without, however, overlooking underlying traits which are less susceptible to change. It is this network which helps to shape mutual perceptions between civilians and soldiers.2 If this is not done, statements as to why actors acted in the way they did or why they hold definite views about each other are destined to remain partial. One of the chief claims of this article is that the Turkish army's perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of the state renders it difficult for soldiers fully to accept the principle of civilian supremacy. In other words, it is hard to argue that the Turkish military in its behaviour and attitudes is ready to accept civil control of the military. This apparently simple point is usually overlooked in those analyses which blame solely civilian politicians and institutions for military involvement in politics. It is also argued that the praetorian tendency of Turkish soldiers is severely limited. Although they have some deep reservations in respect of civil control, it would be unfair to suggest that they favour long-term military rule or pseudo democracy. Their attitude is at best ambivalent. On the one hand, soldiers value the democratic regime. But on the other hand

Civil–military relations · Democracy · Dilemma · Epistemology · Interdependence · International relations · International relations theory · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Relation (database · Security Dilemma · Sociology · Turkish · Computer Science · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Turkey's Politics and Society

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