The Generals' ‘Revolt’

On the eve of the Six Day War 1967, a sharp rift developed between Israel's military high command and the Government, especially with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. The officers demanded a preemptive strike against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai but Eshkol. In two stormy meeting the prime minister and some of his ministers held with IDF's generals on May 28 and June 2, 1967. Many commentators referred to what happened during these meetings as a “Putsh” or revolt, implying that the general's pressure exerted by the general crossed the line and were illegitimate. This article will examine the back ground and proceeding of these meetings and revaluate the confrontation and it impact on the decision making of the government to go to war on 5 June 1967. Notes In preparing this article I drew heavily and with gratitude on an excellent book: A. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963–67 (London: Routledge, 2007). I also discussed the subject with Dr Gluska and attended his lectures. Lior dictated his memoirs to the journalist Eitan Haber who published them in book form. See E. Haber, Today War Will Break Out: The Reminiscences of Brigadier-General Israel Lior, Aide-de-Camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987) (Hebrew). Lior uses the term to describe what he believed was a pre-planned and well-orchestrated collusion to depose Eshkol from his position as minister of defence and install Moshe Dayan in his stead. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p.204. For a full description of the operation see A. Ayalon, ‘Operation Magressa’, Ma'arachot, No.261–2 (March 1978), pp.27–38 (Hebrew). Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p.109. For a more detailed description see Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, chapter 10. In an off-the-record interview, Moshe Dayan blamed the Israeli military commanders of intentionally provoking the flare-ups. See R. Tal, ‘Moshe Dayan: Self-Reckoning’, Ma'ariv, 27 April 1997 (Hebrew). Quoted in Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, p.180. For full description of the air-battle see A. Cohen, The Defence of the Water Sources (Tel Aviv: Israel Air Force Historical Branch, 1992), pp.163–80 (in Hebrew). For the record of Eshkol's involvement see Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp.142–3. E. Weizman, On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p.207. Quoted form the Levi Eshkol archive in Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, p.53. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p.146. The straits near Sharm el-Sheikh are also called the ‘Straits of Tiran’ after the name of the island in the middle. Israelis use the name ‘Straits of Eilat’. I shall use all these different names, depending on the context. See Major-General Aharon Yariv assessment in the protocol of the General Staff meeting on 19 May 1967, IDF Archive. The content of this cable was made public by Shams Badran, the Egyptian war minister, during his trial after the defeat. See S. Itzhaki, In the Eyes of the Arabs: The Six Day War and After (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1969), p. 95. Itzhaki, who was at the time an analyst at the Intelligence Branch on the Egypt desk, published his book early in 1969. The book was published long before the relevant archives and other sources became accessible to researchers. Nevertheless, since it was based on much of the information available to the Israeli command at the time, it helps to understand the way the Israeli officers interpreted what happened on the other side. Ibid. On 23 May, Rabin suffered a temporary nervous breakdown, which was attributed to heavy strain and to his feeling of loneliness. See his own account of this affair in Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv Publications, 1979), pp.158–61 (Hebrew). On the early phase of the crisis see Itzhaki, In the Eyes of the Arabs, pp.86–94. Quoted in ibid., pp.101–2. For a more detailed explanation of his thinking, see M. Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York: Harper, 1978), pp.178–83. See M. Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ma'arahot, 1990) (Hebrew). Shimon Peres, who served at the time as deputy minister of defence, defined in 1962 the closure of the Straits of Eilat as a clear casus belli. See S. Peres, ‘Meimad ha-Zman’ [The Time Dimension], Ma'arachot, No.41D (1962), pp.3–5. See A. Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987). Records of the Knesset's Committee on Foreign and Security Affairs, 17 May 1967, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem (ISA). Protocol of the cabinet's committee on security affairs, 23 May 1967, ISA. For a detailed discussion of the meeting, see Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp.165–170. The semi-official record of the decision-making process at GHQ mentioned three more reasons: changes in the general deployment of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai; the formation of a new Egyptian corps; and the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. During the morning news came in about the advance of Syrian troops on the Golan Heights. See S. Golan, A War on Three Fronts (Tel Aviv: Ma'arahot, 2007), pp.103–6. The cables are quoted by Golan, War on Three Fronts, pp.104 and 107–8. See also detailed paraphrase in Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, pp.284–5. For Eban's version of his mission and these events see A. Eban, An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), chapter 13, pp.339–64. Ibid., p.382. M. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.92–9 and 119–21. Heikal, Sphinx and the Commissar, p.182. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, pp.282–6. Quoted in W.B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.513. On Eban's report to the cabinet, see Eban, An Autobiography, pp.365–7. Protocol of the second cabinet meeting on 28 May 1967, ISA. See also Eban, An Autobiography, pp.369–70. Shimon Golan used both sources. See Golan, A War on Three Fronts, pp.122–6. See also Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp.194–8. The quotations are from these sources. Quoted from an oral history interview by Michael Oren. Oren, Six Days of War, p.134. M. Dayan, Milestones: An Autobiography (Jerusalem: Yediot Aharonot, 1976), p. 412 (Hebrew). Dayan related in his memoirs that on 22 May 1967, Rabin also came to consult with him. Ibid., p.399. Y. Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.249–51. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, pp.341–2. Protocol of the cabinet meeting, 1 June 1967, ISA. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, p.181. Golan, A War on Three Fronts, p.128 In a meeting with Robert McNamara, the secretary of defence, Amit felt that the American gave Israel an ‘Amber Light’ for the attack. See his report of the mission to Washington in M. Amit, Head On (Tel Aviv: Hed Arzi, 1999), pp.237–42 (Hebrew). Eban, An Autobiography, pp.385–6. See Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, p.366. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p.204. This meeting was recorded verbatim and the citations are taken from the full protocol found in the IDF Archive. A detailed rendering of the meeting can be found in Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, pp.259–66; Golan, A War on Three Fronts, pp.122–6; and Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp.204–12. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p.213. S. Nakdimon, ‘The Officers' Revolt’, Yediot Aharonot, 15 Sept. 1985. On Ben-Gurion's fears see also S. Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour: The Drama that Preceded the Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1968), pp.145–6 (Hebrew). Quoted Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, p.369. Protocol of the meeting. Quoted also in Golan, A War on Three Fronts, p.125. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War, p.367

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