Problems Concerning Later Platonism I

Cherniss. It concerns his protest against the conclusion of Hermodorus (or Dercyllides), things which admit of a ?????? ?a? ?tt??, being unstable and infinite, would be non being : ?ste astat?? ?a? a???f?? ?a? ?pe???? ?a? ??? d? t? t????t?? ???es?a? ?at? ?p?fas?? t?? d?t??. It is clear here is not spoken of the ?? ?v in the sense of the Sophistes. term ?? d? is even not used. But we may well think of some other passages of Plato. I then might first draw attention to Phil. 59a-b, where Plato asks the question whether a science of nature is possible. His answer to this question is, concerning those things which do not possess any stability, nothing stable can be reached by us, so there cannot be any insight or knowledge about them. The stable, the pure and the is pe?? ta ?e? ?at? ta a?t? ?sa?t?? ??e??t?tata ????ta, or what is most akin to them. ? Plato leaves us no doubt: the names of ???? and f????s??, it is said, have their truest and most exact application 45) ?? ta?? pe?? t? ?v d?t?? ?????a?? (when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being). Now, if that which is always the same and unmixed is true being, he clearly means to say the ?te??? or ?e??st? ??s?a (Tim. 35a) is not true being. In opposition to the first principle, which is laid down as a kind of example, intelligible and always the same, this ?te??? is in Tim. 48e qualified as an imitation of the example, coming into being and visible (???es?? ???? ?a? ??at??)

Contemplation · Epistemology · Humanities · Nothing · Opposition (politics · Platonism · Theology · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Law · Philosophy