Institutions and Policy in Iran’s Relations with the GCC

Two overlapping yet distinct sets of developments influence Iran’s position in the Persian Gulf region, one having to do with the Islamic Republic’s own policies and the other with structural factors that are largely beyond the control of policymakers in Tehran. In terms of policy, Tehran’s regional relations are shaped by a confluence of security as well as diplomatic priorities. At the broadest level, the resulting policy output amounts to ensuring Iran’s security interests in the Persian Gulf waterway while at the same time maintaining friendly or at best non-confrontational relations with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Under the Rouhani administration, this policy was summed up under the rubric of the Hormuz Peace Endeavor, HOPE. But such policy pursuits have been consistently hampered by structural factors both indigenous to Iranian politics and exogenous. Within Iran, the insistence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is responsible for the country’s regional security, to repeatedly demonstrate its military prowess and its battle readiness—through holding exercises, drone attacks, and rhetorical if not actual support for the Yemeni Houthis—heightens the regional security dilemma and only serves to further antagonize the United States and its local allies. At the same time, the newly found military confidence and ambitions of countries such as Saudi Arabia and especially United Arab Emirates, backed by what appeared to have been unconditional American support under the Trump administration and continued arms sales and close military ties during the Biden presidency, further perpetuate threat perceptions in Tehran. From Iran’s perspective, structural factors only serve to undermine its policy objectives. Using the Rouhani presidency as a case study, this article examines the role of the interplay between structure and agency, in the form of policy initiatives, in shaping Iran’s posture and behavior in the Persian Gulf region. Iranian foreign and security policy is the product of deliberations and give-and-take compromises between three influential but unequal centers of power. These are the presidency, and by extension the foreign ministry, whose primary field of expertise and influence is foreign policy; the IRGC, which is in charge of national security inside and outside of the country; and the Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say on whatever the other two groups propose and recommend. The policy initiatives that are thus generated find themselves in a regional environment that is highly securitized and sectarianized, has been in the midst of what appears to be an intractable security dilemma, and is heavily influenced, if not altogether shaped by, the United States, which acts as an external balancer and a primary security provider in the region. The article makes two original contributions. First, it demonstrates that appearances to the contrary, Iranian foreign and security policies are not self-contradictory. Policies are produced through deliberations, negotiations, and compromises among three centers, each with strong corporate identities and interests of its own. Although all three power centers are involved in making foreign and security policy, there is institutional coordination among the two less powerful centers, namely the executive and the IRGC. The resulting policy recommendation is then sent to the Leader for his approval. A second original insight revolves around the interaction of the policy generated by Tehran and the regional environment toward which Iranian policies are geared. The Rouhani presidency was a case in point. President Rouhani tried to pursue a policy of rapprochement and détente with Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbors. But his efforts fell short because the pervasive features of the Gulf—sectarianism and securitization, US influence, and security dilemma—were deeply entrenched and not easily subject to change. Through the HOPE initiative Rouhani tried to change the regional security environment. But by the time the Iranian president launched his campaign, the prevailing security environment had long become institutionalized already. What Rouhani was suggesting was not simple adjustments or institutional tweaking; he sought a fundamental reordering of the regional security arrangement, one in which Iran and its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with whom Iran has had tense relations, work collectively and collaboratively to ensure regional security. This flew not only in the face of the region’s deep security dilemma, it challenged the role of the United States as an outside security provider and went against the very logic of sectarianism. Rouhani’s policy initiatives were undermined by the institutional arrangements that Persian Gulf security had come to assume over the course of the last several decades. Institutions can be defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels.” They are “rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official.”11 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 5. Across the GCC, each of the three developments outlined here have assumed the form of widely accepted rules and norms that guide assumptions and serve to predict behavior. They have, in other words, become institutionalized. Institutions, of course, are not immune to change, and they may even change extensively.22 Kathleen Thalen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 208-240; and, Margaret Levi, “Theories of Historical and Institutional Change.” PS, Vol. 20, no. 3 (1987), pp. 684-88. But for institutional change to occur, especially of the kind that was sought by Rouhani, announcing an initiative and seeking to promote it through speeches and public diplomacy was hardly enough. What was needed was a sustained, multipronged effort. It from with in the prevailing security they assume that HOPE be to interests was the in had of from the The of course, was from the only that the Persian security dilemma may come to an What the is that for the Iran’s posture in the Persian and the region’s tense security environment are to change. In its the article with an of foreign and security in Iran during the Rouhani It then at policies with the environment in which they found as was the case with for at other up against as with the HOPE Institutions may not be easily but they are not through the and the of Tehran at the time, the of Iran’s policy initiatives to rapprochement with the country’s Arab to the These of not may even with a administration in in Tehran. The foreign policy that of Tehran is the product of the interplay of policy on the one and institutional factors the Islamic Republic’s on the This is largely a product of the institutional of the Iranian which features centers of with overlapping and developments have to on the of foreign policy the Rouhani presidency, efforts at developments the of the Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in policy and in making his with a in the and influence of the IRGC. The was to Iranian foreign policy and from the that foreign policy is a product of and between three corporate centers of presidency, the of the Leader, and the foreign policy has to be and is to on as they In Iranian politics was with the of Iranian foreign policy was a product of in and Vol. pp. The of Iranian policy a the country’s with the from the presidency of in and the of A to the of the Islamic and his the as and such as the United have of to and to a the against while the and it as to its and less powerful states with and on all the themselves but to of and Iran of the Islamic of Iran in pp. was especially his of the by the that he at and foreign policy highly and by the same that had the Iranian In his that is to from the and his to to the of the to the of Iran’s Iranian foreign policy the of highly and In the of foreign policy was even if his was the course of his in for a of to and in his own to a with his American to three on on the on to a initiative in only to be by the United States, which to the in Iranian What the Vol. pp. on a of at and Rouhani a to and his by an in the of the president to Iran’s relations with the outside and to the by with the United the was in through the of the of by then the from the Arab had securitized and the Persian Gulf and states had in the with and the that and had and for through the or of Iran’s with Saudi Arabia thus assumed and with to the of regional power The of by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab in and Iran’s support of further to the between Iran on the one and Saudi with the and on the on this and in the Vol. pp. is to promote and for all the of the of Hormuz region, and to and and friendly relations This initiative for such as the of security, of and of and other to and from the of Hormuz and of the including Rouhani’s on The was by Rouhani to Saudi and the in an to with the two to the Iranian of the has been regional and that be shaped in the region, and the US not the from each to Saudi US HOPE appeared to have support among Iran’s policy who its and a of the of regional security and to and its subject namely a to and regional to yet security that only perpetuate further arms and for the Hormuz Peace it had the of the and power the Iranian foreign policy namely the of the Ayatollah Ali was as the and assumed the position of Leader, the power and position of his have the with the influential and Ali as was involved in foreign policy and was on only a to the and relations with the United This continued the but to change with the of which involved in the country’s politics and and Iran’s Vol. p. The of relations between and the and between and only further the in with the Leader making his policy and from a to an to with the of regional politics and Iran’s in and and in has in the of the Iranian and especially he appears to have as the of the country’s in policy President Rouhani’s efforts at rapprochement with Saudi and that the of the with the United States and the not have been the In other words, a it to Iran’s In an of his actual and his policy to be by a that on assumptions of of of security, and and Iran Ayatollah from the of Ayatollah Vol. pp. A power the Iranian foreign policy is the IRGC. that over the last of the to be the powerful of the and that its from the of the Revolutionary of and The Arab Gulf States in p. At the same time, the of and who are to to the to be and The of and who the at the of the from and less and were deeply to the of the in the from to by had or had on to other A second and is assumed to be less and in the of the and were to have for the In in an to the the to of its same a of the from and and and in This whose was on as it the is to be to and is to Revolutionary of the United Vol. p. This and of have come to the at a time of and regional and Iran’s in its In of this is who was as the by in not to be from in with the of the his has been and his to and the United States and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab to with Revolutionary A of for p. of the United States as an power whose it to and, to it to Iran, to the the US to a of efforts to change, from to and Revolutionary pp. the primary of the the the of the from the United States and its regional to be its a of a under its Ali in the the in both structure and and in the is with the Iranian on and power Two A for the of p. A of around this time between Iran’s and the with the in charge of the in the and the of in the and the largely on and in the Persian p. The of the of the on appears not to have the for this is that the the and the IRGC, which are to in the These the of groups in namely the the the and several the appears to be an as by the of the has in to by the Ali Arab Gulf States The external environment in which Iran has only the and has it a in and foreign policy Iran’s for all its and its the has the of which was its of the in in the was in its for the of to to American military American assumed to be of Rouhani’s the appears to have been to support the efforts by on the one and by of American military or on Iran’s on the and Revolutionary from to of the of Vol. pp. At the has been a an and its has been and it has the who has the final say in with which the is It is this institutional that Iran’s policy in to the Persian Gulf states is shaped and The presidency is in charge of foreign policy and with the and the Leader having the final In to its security and the has three it to the country’s external security. These are the of relations with and other in and of the Hormuz and the and of the country’s The Leader, Khamenei, who has repeatedly to be a with the to the to Rouhani and as of the three power centers the Leader, the IRGC, and the presidency to say the same at in come as of and is a of between each of three power The presidency, and with it the foreign ministry, is in charge of the country’s foreign policy and The national security both and the country’s and its national security are by the which is by the In national security, it is the that the of the Council the of the the of the of the and the IRGC, and of and In have of in as well as on outside of the a of especially from the has its to its in actual and in the it has the to be both and in with The of is if not to of the public on the of an Iranian in in an on a in in the of a US drone in the on the Saudi in in and the on two US in in in for the of These with the of and have the public and of the in the of The of Iran’s regional as well as have only this primary to the of Iran’s national security at and the in The of has to do with of power in to regional and in to has repeatedly that he with the United and on Iran, The In the same of the Iranian three power centers to change in for that in of the other regional Arabia and Iran to At the same time, Iranian do not Saudi Arabia to be an that can its own foreign policy The on its they only if they with the or of the United and Iran on p. with the or the rhetorical by for the presidency to pursue efforts at rapprochement with the both and the demonstrate A second Iranian national security is the of the with of in charge of Iran’s foreign and security policies were or in the in the if they were not they have of Iran’s as the by American and by Saudi and on Iranian and on Iranian It is this of the that Iran’s one against Iran to pursue and for Iran in security Islamic to the of the and the is a shaping Iranian security namely the of Iran’s of with the US and the in military has the country’s military to as and This has in to and has a of Iranian national security namely the of close and with foreign and The of states in and and has Iran to close with local groups with whom it has Iran, the of the in is of and a in with for Iran’s relations with the of the Arab Iran in for pp. In Iran the of its its to the which for Iran has been the against From Tehran’s perspective, in and several security as well as These military and and from the of in to pp. The of this to the IRGC, and to the in whose is to and outside of The between the and foreign appears to one of two In a of the ties with local with whom it has and in The of such a is the The have been in Iranian military in Iran’s with the is and subject to at the very Iran is a of support for the Yemeni policy the in a on a Vol. pp. These groups are not Iran’s they may support from the in and they largely at and Iran’s or A between the and foreign can be found in a namely the and of foreign that are then in The is up of from in and the of who are in in the in the the the and and eds. pp. The and are under the of the and do not the initiatives of Iran’s foreign and security policy a of structural over of which Iranian have had or have Iran’s posture toward the Arab states of the Persian three factors the of the region’s the region’s security and American three of Iran’s power centers have had a in each of they are not at the of they But by this influence is not to change to the security environment which they The of the policy that from are a product not only of policy deliberations and compromises between the Leader, the IRGC, and the presidency, but the of structural factors that in the Persian Iranian policymakers in a highly securitized and regional one which they themselves have for Saudi and the Arab that University Press, and, in the From the to the Arab University Press, the of Iran’s public diplomacy and its efforts to Arab neighbors. if Gulf policy to the HOPE they have had a time on to it pervasive assumptions Iran among Arab A public of in Arab for found that of the and policymakers in Arab as the as between the Islamic and the Arab toward and Iran’s in the for p. of Arab Arab countries are or very in with Iran, only that the same for Iran is not at all or not relations with the Arab p. 5. had or a rapprochement between the US and Iran, with the the of Iranian over the pp. The countries in the were Saudi United Arab Emirates, and to the Iran was the that the threat to the p. the was the region, including in Iran, have only This has only perpetuate the region’s security the states are among the on military as a of a from to on the states of on military in the US of its on the and for the and are Iran and the in the p. This is the that the Arab states of the Gulf under actual military and both and the have in Iran and the in the p. In the United States and Saudi Arabia was the on at and in the at The p. a of the Iran’s military is less of the Iran’s military is less of the and the threat it to its is as In Iran and the are in own regional of having themselves in a security dilemma from which they pp. p. factors shaping and on both of the Gulf at work in the of a of states in the has Iran’s with the states of the GCC, in with Saudi Arabia and the the in the that between Iran and Gulf states in efforts to interests in the Iran, has long its for of on in The Iran to is not and the in for in Iran Leader of the in with Iran and are Iran, p. efforts to a between the and the and a for a to Iran its the between to having a to to the Gulf States and the Vol. p. Saudi and efforts to from less were in by to from Iran’s the Iran’s of have its if not in to to the Saudi and efforts and its from to to the to to have pp. But through and with Iran and has to on to power a the country’s In to its own interests have been had in Iran an to Saudi Iran’s relations with the to its relations with other are by its and interests on the one and its of military on the the be the Iranian in and the of the p. In to and the its for a of Iran to a of the Saudi in the in which the be for the Through and to the Iran is to Saudi in a that the the close to the Saudi in Iran can have a pp. all the states of the GCC, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are the Iran and Saudi Arabia themselves as regional for whom security. is by national role with each to that it to the a that was as a of the Arab in and the course and in and and in and Arab Vol. p. of and, in level, the p. The of in Saudi Arabia has Iranian and Saudi national role to and p. Iranian national role around the Islamic a regional a of the of and a against Saudi national role around the as a regional and a of the but not of Iran’s but of and, Saudi Arabia as a of the US and a of regional but under the of an American security The Arab and the and they from Iran and Saudi only further the in The of and Iran’s and to the has the pp. Saudi and Iranian to the and of the other by the of institutional that Saudi Arabia and or p. to antagonize its primary security Saudi to Iran’s efforts at rapprochement has been at especially during the Trump administration, because of American to and At the Saudi was not that Iranian had the to with the They the in Iran to be the or Khamenei, or the on of the and Iran on p. that the American on Iran was as by the to the in in Iran’s regional an of Saudi in Saudi Iran and in the Persian p. its the Iranian foreign was that Iran is to have in the and Iran on p. It tried this by but this and other efforts were by Saudi Arabia as public relations with or the assumed that Iran’s was from a position of and that the American were having Iran, it was was making the only as a of pp. has factors that and are But they are to the of politics on Gulf Saudi Arabia and Iran, p. to this politics has been the United States, which the role of an external balancer and a primary security provider to the The US the Persian Gulf as an of to its interests have over time, has the American for to its the appeared to that the of US policy interests are Saudi Arabia and of Saudi Arabia and in the Persian University Press, pp. In to the two Gulf even the Trump administration, with its toward Iran and its with Saudi Saudi Arabia the Iran the American it to relations with one of policies and the of policies of the Rouhani administration the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council in and Saudi Arabia in were by and the of the HOPE the institutional of the Iranian foreign and security policy the president not have and policies and influence from power the through the deliberations of the the Leader his the IRGC, and the foreign and security policies are and and a is to what Saudi policymakers an initiative HOPE have been by Rouhani had it not had the Khamenei, of course, has over the the of the the only to say it all if the policy to What policies come of Tehran are of negotiations, and between three unequal power centers, with the to have over the presidency by extension the foreign in national security, but to the Leader and has the final say in all policies are to up against that can and or In to Rouhani’s Tehran’s initiatives the of a highly securitized and a Saudi Arabia that to from with Iran, and an security environment that the of Iranian Institutions which and pursue initiatives and But they are not can change through with or through and the that to is the that are of in other words, for a rapprochement between Iran and its Arab to the In in Iran and Saudi Arabia a of in in which they security In the same of the of a regional security that both Iran and the p. Institutions are only if they are as such by as the United States and its role in the Persian Gulf is the of President Biden in the to what as the Biden In Iran was as a threat to regional but of a rapprochement between the Islamic and its the US a of in the Persian Gulf and The of the Biden are James Biden The US for a for in the and, Biden Saudi Arabia a change of in to Iran, especially the had unconditional in the United States for its The the country’s foreign and security policies has in to and the of the US in case of a military with Iran, and a of with Iran, of the kind that or of a is to Iran is for the to In the a while not officially is as in the Leader, Khamenei, is to be around for and the centers of power the Islamic are then especially as as the is is to change the and if not the of Iranian What that change and the Persian Gulf and Iran’s position it is a that only time can by the

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