Educating the Sceptic

Inspired by the major part of scepticism in recent philosophy of education, one of the sources of scepticism in classical antiquity is reconstructed in view of its educational consequences. It is the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most elaborate and consistent forms on record. Its major characteristic is the suspension of judgement on all issues that cannot be settled without any possible objections, while maintaining the classical definition of truth. Suspension of judgement leads to tranquillity, an untroubled condition of the soul. From this radical sceptical view, more recent views that are sometimes called sceptical, like anti‐foundationalism, relativism and anti‐realism, must be considered dogmatic. Despite of that, Sextus’ scepticism does not forbid teaching and education, because it allows participation in common life as long as truth‐claims are avoided. It is also not necessarily conservative, as common life can be revolutionary. However, it becomes paradoxical whenever one tries to teach non‐sceptics to adopt the sceptic way, because then an appeal to principles or truth‐claims seems unavoidable. *We like to thank Thorn Petrescu for his helpful suggestions and comments, especially on the technical (Greek) aspects of Sextus Empiricus’ works. Notes *We like to thank Thorn Petrescu for his helpful suggestions and comments, especially on the technical (Greek) aspects of Sextus Empiricus’ works

Appeal · Epistemology · Judgement · Political science · Premise · Relativism · Skepticism · Tranquillity · Augustinian Studies and Theology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Psychology

• Relativism and the Critical Potential of Philosophy of Education

  Open Access•Frieda Heyting•Journal of Philosophy of Education•2004

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