The Cautionary Account of Supererogation

Bibliographic Data

ID10344205
AuthorsSeyyed Mohsen Eslami (0000-0003-3804-2428, Tarbiat Modares University and Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)), Alex Archer (0000-0001-9398-6427, Tilburg University)
Year2024
Volume75
Issue2
Pages493-516
Publication date2024-01-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae017
OpenAlexW4391915557
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy

Class (philosophy · Epistemology · Sacrifice · Theology · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access