The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344210 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas Campbell (0000-0002-9202-1241, University of Canterbury), Jack Copeland (University of Canterbury), Zhuo-Ran Deng (University of Canterbury) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Pages | pqw066-pqw066 |
| Publication date | 2016-10-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqw066 |
| OpenAlex | W2541986723 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 8 |
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C’s conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C’s premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M’s premises. But M’s premises are modelled on a pair of C’s premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason, a conceivabilist can repudiate M’s premises only on pain of severely undermining C’s premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)–(iv), are fallacious
Argument (complex analysis · Dualism · Epistemology · Identity (music · Materialism · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |