On Trying to Leave Truth Alone
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344296 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Zapero (0000-0001-5342-5414, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 197-217 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab004 |
| OpenAlex | W3128522539 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
According to a certain conception of language, any sentence can, when used on an occasion, have any of indefinitely many truth-conditions. Such a conception of language gives us reason to think that the question of whether the notion of truth has a distinctive content cannot be settled by looking solely at the predication of truth. By focusing on the predicate ‘true’ when trying to determine the significance of the notion of truth, we may have been looking in the wrong place
Alethiology · Coherence theory of truth · Epistemology · Linguistics · Logical truth · Pragmatic theory of truth · Predicate (mathematical logic · Semantic theory of truth · Sentence · Truth condition · Truth value · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|