Direct acquaintance with intrinsic value

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10344367
AutoresMartin Dimitrov (0000-0003-0525-5195, University of Toronto , Philosophy, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen75
Número2
Páginas428-449
Fecha de publicación2024-04-12
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae029
OpenAlexW4394760713
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas18

Upon introspection, we judge that suffering feels bad. I argue there is no appearance-reality gap when it comes to introspective judgments about simple, intrinsic, nonrepresentational phenomenal states like itches, tingling, and suffering's feeling bad. On constitutivism about phenomenal introspection, there is no appearance-reality gap here because these judgments are literally constituted by the phenomenal states they are about. As a result, we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic properties of experience in having these judgments. Reflecting on our direct acquaintance with intrinsic badness, we can know that our suffering instantiates this judgment-independent evaluative property

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Feeling · Introspection · Perception · Property (philosophy · Simple (philosophy · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology