Needs as Causes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344368 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ashley Shaw (0000-0001-7559-3224, University of Leeds, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-12 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae146 |
| OpenAlex | W4405355328 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
Facts about need play some role in our causal understanding of the world. We understand, for example, that people have basic needs for food, water, and shelter, and that people come to be harmed because those needs go unmet. But what are needs? How do explanations in terms of need fit into our broader causal understanding of the world? This paper provides an account of need attribution, their contribution to causal explanations, and their relation to disposition attribution
Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Depth
Events as Property Exemplifications
Causal Relations
What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean
Psychosemantics
Program explanation
Modern Moral Philosophy
Are Dispositions Causally Relevant
Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions
The Authority of Desire
Bare Quantifiers
Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory
The Necessity of ‘Need
Control in Generative Grammar
Teaching & learning guide for
Finkish Dispositions
Having 'Need' and Needing 'Have
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |