Tying the Knot

Why Representationalists should Endorse the Sensorimotor Theory of Conscious Feel

Bibliographic Data

ID10344387
AuthorsDavid Silverman (0000-0002-6648-3098, Délégation Paris 5, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume66
Issue263
Pages280-301
Publication date2015-10-19
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv097
OpenAlexW2278646842
LanguageEN
References cited24

The sensorimotor theory of perception and consciousness is frequently presented as a variety of anti-representationalist cognitive science, and there is thus a temptation to suppose that those who take representation as bedrock should reject the approach. This paper argues that the sensorimotor approach is compatible with representationalism, and moreover that representationalism about phenomenal qualities, such as that advocated by Tye, would be more complete and less vulnerable to criticism if it incorporated the sensorimotor account of conscious feel. The paper concludes by arguing that the project of naturalizing phenomenal qualities would nonetheless be better served by abandoning ‘representation’ talk altogether, a move that would require only a small modification of existing representationalist accounts

Cognitive psychology · Consciousness · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Intentionality · Perception · Politics · Representation (politics · Temptation · Tying · Variety (cybernetics · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neural dynamics and brain function · Philosophy · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology

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