Fundamental Nomic Vagueness

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10344481
AutoresEddy Keming Chen (0000-0001-5144-0952, University of California San Diego, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume131
Fascículo1
Páginas1-49
Data de publicação2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-9415127
OpenAlexW3132951415
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas11
Referências citadas25

If there are fundamental laws of nature, can they fail to be exact? In this paper, I consider the possibility that some fundamental laws are vague. I call this phenomenon fundamental nomic vagueness. I characterize fundamental nomic vagueness as the existence of borderline lawful worlds and the presence of several other accompanying features. Under certain assumptions, such vagueness prevents the fundamental physical theory from being completely expressible in the mathematical language. Moreover, I suggest that such vagueness can be regarded as vagueness in the world. For a case study, we turn to the Past Hypothesis, a postulate that (partially) explains the direction of time in our world. We have reasons to take it seriously as a candidate fundamental law of nature. Yet it is vague: it admits borderline (nomologically) possible worlds. An exact version would lead to an untraceable arbitrariness absent in any other fundamental laws. However, the dilemma between fundamental nomic vagueness and untraceable arbitrariness is dissolved in a new quantum theory of time’s arrow

Arbitrariness · Arrow · Dilemma · Epistemology · Fuzzy logic · Linguistics · Phenomenon · Physical law · Physics · Theoretical physics · Vagueness · Advanced Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications