Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10344902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrea Sauchelli (0000-0002-7665-8875, Department of Philosophy & Hong Kong Catastrophic Risk Centre Lingnan University Hong Kong SAR China, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 157-172 |
| Publication date | 2025-05-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.70015 |
| OpenAlex | W4410496931 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti‐natalism, the normative view that we should refrain from procreating
Collective responsibility · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Pessimism · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Better Never to Have Been
Death and the Afterlife
The Atrocity Paradigm
How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?
How you can help, without making a difference
Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?
The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer
Weighing Lives
Weltschmerz
Massively Shared Agency
Joint Moral Duties
A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
A thousand pleasures are not worth a single pain
Pessimism about the Future
Population ethical intuitions
Confronting Evils
Benatar and the Logic of Betterness
Does the Lack of Cosmic Meaning Make Our Lives Bad
Asymmetries in the Value of Existence
Headaches, Lives and Value
How To Share An Intention
Pessimism and procreation
Against Absolute Goodness
Comparing Harms
Collective harm and the inefficacy problem
Partial aggregation in ethics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |