Precis of Consciousness Explained

Bibliographic Data

ID10345127
AuthorsDaniel C Dennett (0000-0003-1181-3093, corresponding author)
Year1993
Volume53
Issue4
Pages889-889
Publication date1993-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2108259
OpenAlexW2511093159
LanguageEN
Citations received24

Consciousness has always been a baffling phenomenon, and some have seen it to be fundamentally mysterious, irretrievably beyond human understanding. I argue, on the contrary, that its mysteries are beginning to dissolve, thanks largely to the onslaught of empirical and conceptual advances in cognitive science. So entrenched, however, are the traditional ways of addressing the philosophical problems, that a frontal assault on them is doomed. One cannot hope to convince philosophers by straightforward arguments to abandon the obvious assumptions whose mutual acceptance has defined the debates. A more indirect approach is called for (Preview, pp. 16-18), postponing a direct confrontation with the traditional categories until a new perspective has been created, and the reader familiarized with some of its powers. This is a three-stage operation. In Part I, a survey of phenomena and putative difficulties sets the problem and establishes a method. The goal is to create a materialistic, scientifically supported but still deliberately sketchy, model that can actually explain all the puzzling phenomena. The method for achieving this goal requires a philosophically and scientifically neutral way of describing the data-a phenomenology in its original sense of a pre-theoretical catalogue of phenomena. In Part II, the sketch of the model, the Multiple Drafts Model, is developed and supported, and put through some of its paces. Finally, in Part III, the philosophical implications of the Multiple Drafts Model are examined. Only then do I confront the challenges invoking folk psychological categories, and such philosophical terms as qualia, epiphenomenalism, zombie, and finctionalism, the staple diet of philosophical debate in recent years. (This indirect approach does not work for all readers, I have learned. Some find the temporary suspension of allegiance to traditional categories beyond them, or are unwilling to venture it. Those who insist on trying to impose their favorite philosophical distinctions on the book from the outset are almost bound to find the first two parts exasperatingly elusive, even

Consciousness · Epistemology · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

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