The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining

Bibliographic Data

ID10345164
AuthorsMark P Drost (corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume50
Issue3
Pages569-569
Publication date1990-03-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2108165
OpenAlexW2313127708
LanguageEN
Citations received5

According to Husserl, intentionality of perceptual consciousness is model for other nonperceptual intentional acts of mind, such as imagining. The purpose of this paper is to show that in Logical Investigations intentionality of perceptual consciousness is model for understanding imaginal acts. Husserl outlines two distinct situations in which one speaks of an image: (a) there is imaginal act in which one perceived physical object is an image of another perceivable object, and (b) there is imaginal act in which a mental content is an intermediate in intention of an object. In each case Husserl shows that the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness.' Of two imaginal acts, I argue that first is logically dependent on a perceptual intention, and that second is explicable in terms of a perceptual intention rather than in terms of a pictorial representation. I conclude that nonmental images cannot be a paradigm for understanding situation in which an image is a mental event, that images cannot be basis for perceptual acts, and that Husserl is not committed to a view that mental images are pictures in mind

Cognitive science · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Perception · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Historical Thought · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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