Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology

Bibliographic Data

ID10345170
AuthorsWilliam S Robinson (0000-0001-5227-1046, Iowa State University, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume70
Issue3
Pages534-562
Publication date2005-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00414.x
OpenAlexW2142447753
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited11

Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that p, and a different non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary 'what it is like' to have one propositional attitude type rather than another

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Feeling · Phenomenology (philosophy · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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