Searching for social properties

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10345367
AutoresDee Payton (0000-0002-4307-921X, Howard University Washington DC, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen106
Número3
Páginas741-754
Fecha de publicación2022-06-24
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12901
OpenAlexW4283387614
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas23

What does it take for a property to be a social property? This question is different from questions about what it takes for a property to be socially constructed . That is: it is one thing to be social, it is another to be socially constructed. Compared to questions about social construction, this question about sociality has received relatively little attention in social metaphysics. Here, I work from a very specific set of observations which arise from the social metaphysics literature to uncover a sufficient condition on sociality for properties, a condition which I argue all non‐social properties fail to satisfy

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Property (philosophy · Set (abstract data type · Social philosophy · Social relation · Social science · Sociality · Sociology · Computer Science · Ecology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology