The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial

Bibliographic Data

ID10345547
AuthorsKevin Richardson (0000-0001-8576-8307, Duke University, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume107
Issue1
Pages192-207
Publication date2022-08-08
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12916
OpenAlexW4295705288
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited50

According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree‐theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Indeterminacy (philosophy · Metaphysics · Ontology · Philosophy of mind · Pluralism (philosophy · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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