On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345633 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Taylor Carman (0000-0001-5768-5627, Barnard College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 561-561 |
| Publication date | 2001-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3071155 |
| OpenAlex | W4246915469, W2047981059 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Herman Philipse's Heidegger's Philosophy of Being is an attempt to interpret, analyze, and ultimately discredit the whole of Heidegger's thought. But Philipse's reading of the texts is uncharitable, and the ideas he presents and criticizes often bear little resemblance to Heidegger's views. Philipse relies on a crude distinction between “theoretical” and “applicative” interpretations in arguing that Heidegger's conception of interpretation as a kind of projection ( Entwurf ) is, like the liar's paradox, formally self‐defeating. But even granting the distinction, the charge of reflective incoherence is fallacious and question‐begging. Finally, Philipse advances the astonishing “interpretive hypothesis” that the seemingly morbid existential themes in Being and Time were part of a deliberate “Pascalian strategy” to win converts to Heidegger's own idiosyncratic “postrnonotheist worship of Being.” In short, notwithstanding its nearly comprehensive coverage of Heidegger's works, the book does not represent a sufficiently serious effort to understand the complexities and obscurities of Heidegger's thinking
Epistemology · Existentialism · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Nonsense · Reading (process · Sense (electronics · Chemistry · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |